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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
01~ THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
\ 
STATE OF UTAH, \ 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
CASE 
No. 1132 
GRANT ALLEN ADAMSON, 
Trans. Pa.re 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Utah, 
Hon. M. J. Bronson, Judge, Presiding 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
109 In spite of the lack of evidence presented by the 
State, the lower court refused to dismiss this case of 
involuntary manslaughter, and the defendant, Grant 
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Allen Adan1son, was convicted, as the result of a collision 
between the gasoline truck which he was driving and the 
bicycle ridden by a boy, Sylvester Kanon, who was killed 
by the ilnpact. The collision occurred at the intersection 
85 of Dth South Street and 2nd West Street in Salt Lake 
City, as the defendant was making a left turn from 2nd 
\Vest Street into 9th South Street. Although it was 
114 dark, the bicycle had no light and was in the middle of 
the road. 
The State failed so completely in presenting evidence 
of any negligence of the defendant that the defendant 
himself was not put on the stand to testify. The only 
testimony of the defendant's speed at the intersection of 
115 the accident was that he was driving slowly. The State's 
sole witness of the defendant's speed, C. E. Moulton, did 
not testify what the defendant's speed was at the time 
of the accident nor immediately before it. It was some-
where between 3rd South and 9th South Streets that 
Moulton looked at his speedometer and found that the de-
74 fendant was going between 38 and 40 miles per hour. He 
did not say where it was on 2nd West Street that the 
defendant was going at this speed~ It may have been 
five blocks away from the scene of the accident. This 
witness claims he was sure of this speed; yet he had 
testified at the preliminary hearing that this speed was 
80 between 35 and 38 miles per hour. There was also some 
equivocation on his own rate of speed as compared with 
that of the defendant. On the night in question (August 
5, 1940) Grant Adamson, the defendant, was driving a 
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gasoline truck southward on 2nd 'Vest Street in Salt 
Lake City. The witness l\Ioulton was stopped in the 
drive,vay of an ice crean1 parlor on the west side of 2nd 
73 West Street bet,veen 3rd and 4th South Streets, as the 
defendant rode past hin1. He started up and caught up 
with the defendant. On cross examination he admitted 
that in doing so he increased his rate of speed above that 
of the defendant's, and on redirect examination he cor-
rected himself to agree with the prosecution's leading 
82 statement that his car 'vas going at ''about'' the same 
rate of speed as that of the truck at the time he made 
the check. This sole witness of speed, however, himself 
81 testified that the truck slowed down at the intersection 
120 of the accident. Other testimony showed that the truck 
115 was going slowly at the intersection. 
The semaphore light was green toward the north 
and south when the defendant made his left turn. There 
83,84 were lights on at two service stations on the east side 
of 2nd West Street at the northeast and southeast corners 
87 of the intersection. Except for these lights it was dark. 
A Model "A" Ford automobile traveling north on 
2nd West Street crossed the intersection before the de-
114 fendant made his turn. The deceased Sylvester Kanon 
was riding an unlighted bicycle north on 2nd West Street, 
somewhere behind the Ford automobile, carrying some-
thing in a paper sack in one hand. The collision occurred 
approximately 44 feet north of the south curb of 9th 
99 South Street. The body was found 18 feet from the 
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supposed point of impact, and the bicycle 35 feet from 
this supposed point, toward the side of the road. The bi-
cycle was scraped along the road by the truck. The truck 
continued southeast and stopped at the side of 9th South 
Street 157 feet from the supposed point of impact. 
107 There were no skid marks or tire marks of any kind. 
There was a scratch mark in the center of the truck's 
bumper and milk spilt over the windshield and left fender. 
A fruit jar bottle top was on the fender. 
Second West Street north of 9th South Street is a 
101 highway wide enough for four-lane traffic - 83 feet 
wide-but it narrows south of 9th South Street to a two-
lane highway, 45 feet wide. Vehicles traveling north from 
a point south of 9th South Street, unless they turn to the 
right, drive into the center lane of the two north bound 
100 lanes of traffic after they cross 9th South Street. If a 
line were projected due north from the east curb of 2nd 
98 West Street, south of 9th South Street, it would fall 22 
feet west of the east curb of 2nd West Street north of 
9th South. Traffic following the curb would necessarily 
turn in a northeast direction at 9th South Street. The 
pedestrian lane runs in a northeast-southwest direction 
so that a north bound pedestrian crossing 9th South 
Street would, to stay in the pedestrian lane, travel 
not due north, but northeast, e v e n in a m o r e 
106 easterly direction than a line running across Ninth 
South Street from corner to corner of the curbs. The 
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bicycle did not follo\v either the curb direction or the 
pedestrian lane. It passed directly in front of 'vitnesses 
87 \Villian1 and Thomas ~.,owler, t'vo or three feet 
away from them as they 'vere standing on the east curb 
89, 115 of 2nd \\;est Street south of 9th South and continued 
straight north. The indicated point of impact is on a line 
almost directly north of the east curb of Second West 
Street as that curb continues south of Ninth South Street 
(Exhibit B). 
SPECIFICATION OF ERRORS 
I. The court erred in refusing to recognize that the 
State failed to prove the commission of the crime of 
involuntary manslaughter. 
(1). The court erred in denying defendant's motion 
for dismissal at the close of the State's evidence. 
(2)-. The court erred in denying defendant's mo-
tion for a directed verdict in favor of the defendant. 
(3). The court erred in refusing defendant's re-
quested instruction No. 1: "You are instructed to find 
the defendant not guilty.'' 
(4). The court erred in denying the defendant's 
motion in arrest of judgment. 
(5). The court erred in denying defendant's motion 
for a new trial. 
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II. The court erred in refusi!f!g to g,ive defendant's 
requested instructions and in directing the jury. 
( 6). The court erred in giving the fifth subdivision 
of its instruction No. 5 as follows : 
"F,ifth: That it bhall be unlawful for the 
driver of a vehicle within an intersection who in-
tends to turn left to fail to yield to any vehicle 
approaching from the opposite direction which is 
within the intersection or so close thereto as to 
constitute an in1mediate hazard." 
( 7). The court erred in failing to include in the 
fifth subdivision of its Instruction No. 5 all of the statute 
pertinent to the right of way, to-wit: 
''But such driver having so yielded and hav-
ing given a signal when and as required by law 
may make such left turn, and other vehicles ap-
proaching the intersection from the opposite di-
rection shall yield to the driver making the left 
turn.'' 
(8). The court erred in refusing to give defendant's 
requested instruction No. 20 : 
"You are instructed that the Salt Lake City 
ordinances provide that riders of bicycles upon the 
city streets shall drive as closely as practicable to 
the right hand edge or curb of the street except 
when overtaking or passing another vehicle or 
bicycle or when placing a vehicle or bicycle in a 
position to make a left turn.'' 
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(9). The court erred in refusing to give defendant's 
requested Instruction No. 21 : 
"You are instructed that if you find the de-
ceased bieYeli~t 'Yas not following as closely to 
the right l~and curb of the street as practicable~ 
then you must find that he did not have the right 
of "ray over the defendant.'' 
(10). The court erred in refusing to give defend-
ant's requested Instruction No. 12: 
"You are instructed that the la'\v requires 
that, 'Every bicycle upon a highway during the 
period from a half hour after sunset to a half 
hour before sunrise shall be equipped with a 
lighted lamp on the front thereof visible under 
normal atmospheric conditions from a distance of 
at least three hundred feet in front of such 
bicycle '. ' ' 
(11). The court erred in refusing to give defend-
ant's requested Instruction No. 13: 
"You are instructed that if you find that at 
the time of the accident Sylvester Kanon was 
riding a bicycle which was not equipped with a 
lighted lamp that such riding was unlawful, and 
if you find that his so riding was the proximate 
cause of his death you must find the defendant 
not guilty.'' 
(12). The court erred in refusing to give defend-
ant's requested Instruction No. 14: 
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8 
''You are instructed that if you find that Syl-
vester !{anon drove a bicycle at the tune of the 
accident which was not equipped with a lighted 
lamp on the front thereof, his riding the bicycle 
in that rqanner 'vas negligence and should be con-
sidered by you in connection with all other matters 
pertaining to the said accident.'' 
( 13). The court erred in refusing to give defend-
ant's requested Instruction No. 15 : 
"You are instructed that a driver may pre-
8urne that others in the road will conduct them-
selves in a lawful manner. If you find that though 
Sylvester Kanon was within the intersection or 
so close thereto as to constitute an immediate 
hazard he \Vas riding his bicycle in an unlawful 
manner and that it 'vas because of his so riding 
in an unlawful manner that the defendant Grant 
Adamson failed to see him, then you must find 
that the defendant Adamson did not act unlaw-
fully in failing to yield to Sylvester Kanon. '' 
( 14). The court erred in refusing to give defend-
ant's requested Instruction No. 16: 
''You are instructed that the law does not 
require a person to anticipate or guard against 
events which are not reasonably to be expected, 
nor does the law require a person to regulate hi~ 
conduct with reference to the conduct of another 
person which is not reasonably to be expected." 
(15). The court erred in refusing to give defend-
ant's requested Instruction No. 17: 
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"You are instructed that 'vhen a person is 
placed 'vithout negligence on his part suddenly 
in a position of peril \Yithout sufficient ti1ne to 
consider all of the circumstances, the la\v does not 
require of him the same degree of care and cau-
tion that it requires of a person ''Tho has an1ple 
opportunity for the full exercise of hi~ jndgn1ent 
and reasoning facilities." 
(16). The court erred in refusing to give defend-
ant's requested Instruction No. 10: 
''You are instructed that even if you were 
to be convinced that the defendant omitted to 
perform a duty, nevertheless if an unla,vful act 
or negligent act of another person intervened be-
tween the omission of the defendant and the 
death and was the direct cause of the death, then 
you must find the defendant not guilty.'' 
(17). The court erred in refusing to give defend-
ant's requested Instruction No. 18: 
"You are instructed that the Salt I_jake City 
ordinances provide that riders of bicycles upon 
the city streets shall drive as closely as practicable 
to the right hand edge or curb of the street except 
when overtaking or passing another vehicle or 
bicycle, or when placing a vehicle or bicycle in a 
position to make a left turn. You are instructed 
that if you find that the deceased bicyclist vio-
lated the ordinance mentioned in Instruction 
No.____________ you shall find him negligent, and if 
his negligence was the proximate cause of his 
death, you shall find the defendant not guilty.'' 
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(18). The court erred in refusing to give defend-
ant's requested Instruction No. 19: 
''Yon are instructed that if you find that the 
deceased bicyclist violated the ordinance men-
tioned in Instruction No. ____________ you shall find hin1 
negligent, and if his negligence was the proximate 
cause of his death, you shall find the defendant 
not O'uiltv." b " 
( 19). The court erred in refusing to give defend-
ant's requested instruction No. 9 : 
''You are instructed that in determining 
whether or not the defendant was guilty of crimi-
nal negligence as that term is defined to you in 
other instructions you should consider the conduct 
of Sylvester Kanon immediately prior to the acci-
dent and at the time of the accident, together with 
all other facts and circumstances surrounding the 
accident,'' 
and in modifying it as follows in its instruction No. 7A: 
"You are instructed that in determining 
whether or not the defendant is guilty of the crilne 
charged in the information you should consider 
the conduct, insofar as there is evidence thereof, 
of Sylvester Kanon immediately prior to the acci-
dent and at the time of the accident together with 
all the other facts and circun1stances surrounding 
the accident which have been given in evidence. 
If you believe from all the evidence in the case that 
the sole proximate cause of the injuries to and the 
death of the said Sylvester Kanon was a result of 
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11 
the act~ and conduct of the said S~·lve8ter Kanon 
then you should return a verdict of not guilt~'·'' 
( 20). The court erred in refusing to give defend-
ant's requested Instruction No. 3 : 
''You are instructed that the words, 'v\Tithout 
due caution· and circumspection' as used in the 
Statute of the State of Utah defining the offense 
of involuntary manslaughter must be construed 
as meaning 'criminal negligence'. ' ' 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO RECOG-
NIZE THAT THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE 
THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME OF INVOL-
UNTARY MANSLAUGHTER {Specifications of 
Error Nos. 1-5). 
There were four grounds alleged in the bill of par-
10 ticulars as a basis for the charge of manslaughter: 
1. That defendant was driving too fast-
(a). That defendant was driving at a speed greater 
than was reasonable or prudent, having regard to the 
traffic, surface, condition and width of the highway and 
the hazard existing at the intersection. 
(b). That defendant was driving at a speed which 
was greater than would permit him to exercise proper 
control of the vehicle and to decrease speed or to stop as 
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rnight be necessary to avoid colliding with any person or 
vehicle then and there upon the highway, to-wit: that 
the defendant was driving at a speed of between 25 and 
30 1niles per hour. 
2. That the defendant did not keep a proper or any 
lookout. 
3. That defendant failed to yield to Sylvester 
Kanon. 
4. That the defendant was driving without due 
caution and circumspection and at such a speed and in 
such a manner as to endanger the person and property 
of Sylvester Kanon. 
The evidence does not sustain the charge of involun-
tary manslaughter on any of these grounds. 
1. The Defendant's Speed. 
In this ground we are not even involved with the 
problem of whether there was evidence of speed sufficient 
to sustain the charge beyond ,a reasonable doubt. There 
is no evidence, at all, of speed of the vehicle at the time 
of the collision or immediately before it, except that 
115 Grant Adamson, the defendant, was driving slowly. The 
only testimony during the whole trial of Grant Adam-
son's speed except that he was driving slowly was the 
evidence of C. E. Moulton, who stated that Adamson was 
7 4 going between 38 and 40 miles per hour along 2nd West 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Trans. Page 
Street. There is no testi1nony of where on 2nd West 
Street defendant 'vas going at this speed except that it 
was some,vhere between 3rd South and 9th South Streets. 
The accident occurred at the corner of 9th South and 
2nd West Streets "yhile Adamson "\vas 1naking a left turn 
from 2nd ,~vest Street into 9th South Street. Assuming 
that this witness' testimony was reliable, still, in order 
to establish that the defendant was driving at that speed 
in the intersection where the accident occurred, the jury 
must have arbitrarily located this speed at 9th South 
Street, in direct contradiction to testimony that the de-
115 fendant was driving slowly at that point. And Moulton's 
testimony was not reliable: it "\vas questionable at its 
best. He started up from the driveway going out of an 
ice cream parlor on the west side of 2nd VV est Street 
79 between 3rd and 4th South Streets. He drove at a speed 
78 greater than Adamson's speed and caught up with the 
defendant Adamson. Somewhere along 2nd West Street 
he clocked defendant's speed and found the defendant 
was going between 38 and 40 miles per hour. He was 
positive of that, yet he had previously testified that the 
80 defendant was going between 35 and 38 miles per hour. 
No one knows where it was between 3rd South and 9th 
South Streets that the defendant was going at this rate 
115 of speed. In addition to the positive testimony of Thomas 
Fowler that Adamson was driving slowly at 9th South 
81 Street, Moulton himself said he thought the defendant 
''did slow down some.'' At the preliminary hearing 
held at about a week after the accident Moulton testified 
80 that Adamson slowed down appreciably. 
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No evidence was introduced of what speed limits 
there 'vere, if any, nor of any violation of any speed 
lin1it. Of course, the jury can not assume that Adamson 
exceeded a speed limit; neither has the court any right to 
per1nit the jury to assu1ne, because Adan1son was driving 
35 or 40 1niles per hour son1ewhere south of 3rd South 
on 2nd West Street that on the corner of 9th South Street 
he 'vas driving at a speed greater than was reasonable 
and prudent or greater than 'vould permit him to exercise 
proper control of his vehicle. Yet this is what the court 
did. 
Even though we should assume 35 or 40 miles 
per hour exceeds a speed limit, which we have no right 
to do, particularly in a criminal case-and assume fur-
ther-which we still have no right to do, there being no 
evidence of the type of district or the traffic-that such 
a speed along Second West Street was reckless, still we 
cannot overcome the hurdle of the State's failure to 
show that this speed somewhere along Second West 
Street was the proximate cause of the accident. There 
'vas no showing of defective brakes or of the weight 
of the truck. Automobiles are now so constructed for 
quick acceleration and slowing down that testimony of 
speed at some unlocated point away from the intersection 
where the accident occurred is valueless as proof of speed 
at the intersection as the proximate cause of the injury. 
This is particularly true in this case when the maximum 
speed testified to at any point along the route was only 
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81 
forty miles per hour. Thh~ 'vas n1entioned by only one 
'vitness, and 'vas contradicted by his own testimony. 
In Dunville v. State (Ind.), 123 N. E. 689, the de-
fendant 'vas convicted of involuntary n1anslaughter for 
violation of the speed statute. The deceased, a little girl, 
ran into the street in front of his 1notorcycle. When he 
unsuccessfully tried to avoid her, he threw his cornpanion 
against the curb, rendering him unconscious, and his 
motorcycle skidded on its pedal across the street. The 
Supreme Court, reversing the conviction, said: 
"The testi1nony as to his speed at the south 
corner of this block and for two blocks farther 
south is rather ren1ote, considering the fact that 
nothing appears to sho'v hovv far these points were 
from the scene of the accident. It is a 1natter of 
common knowledge that motor vehicles may be 
accelerated and retarded very rapidly. But what-
ever may be said as to the inferences that the 
lower court drew from the testnnony about ap-
pellant's speed, and whether the lower court vvas 
warranted in drawing the inference that he was 
exceeding the speed limit of 15 miles per hour at 
the time the child was struck becomes material 
only when it is shown that the accident would not 
have occurred just as it did had appellant been 
going at a lawful rate ... 
''The most the evidence discloses is negli-
gence on the part of appellant. For aught that 
appears in this case the proximate cause of Fran-
ces Held's death was the fact that she ran in front 
of appellant's motorcycle and suddenly stopped. 
For aught that is shown by the evidence, the acci-
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16 
dent 'vould have occurred had appellant been pro-
ceeding in the most careful rnanner. . . 
''The :finding of the court is not sustained by 
sufficient evidence, and is therefore contrary to 
la\v." 
Not only was there no testimony of undue speed at 
the place of the accident; there was no physical evidence 
107 of speed. There were no skid or tire marks of any kind. 
No assurnptions can or should be drawn from the loca-
tion of the truck driven to the side of the road, nor from 
the location of the bicycle sera ped along the road, nor 
from the location of the body. 
To paraphrase this Court's words in State vs. 
Gutheil, (98 Utah 205, 98 P. (2d) 943) : What was it that 
Adamson did or did not do that shows he acted recklessly 
and in marked disregard of the rights of others! 
''A criminal case requires proof of each ele-
ment of the crime by evidence that convinces one 
beyond all reasonable doubt of the existence of 
each such element. Criminal negligence evidenced 
by a dereliction of some kind conforming to at 
least one of the definitions we have set out, is a 
necessary element of the crime charged here.''-
State vs. Gutheil, supra. 
In short, there is a complete absence in the record of 
any evidence of speed, and a fortiori of any evidence of 
speed to show recklessness or conduct evincing marked 
disregard of the rights of others. 
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2. Proper Lookout. 
It is clear that the 111ere fact that there 'vas an acci-
dent does not show that the driver failed to keep a proper 
lookout (State vs. Guth e i l, supra). There is not one word 
of testin1ony of Adamson's alleged failure to keep a 
proper lookout. He hit a boy on a bicycle. The jury 
must not be allowed to speculate from this in a criminal 
case in which the facts denoting criminal negligence must 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, that Adamson was 
not keeping a proper lookout at the time of the colli-
sion. The circumstances, if we make assumptions, would 
87 lead to the contrary conclusion. It was dark at that time. 
There was an arc light at the southwest corner and lights 
were on at the service stations, but we do not know that 
these lights illuminated the road where the bicycle was 
proceeding. It may have been that the lights at the serv-
ice stations served to confuse the outline of the boy on 
the bicycle rather than to illuminate it. It is common 
knowledge that a well-illuminated object alongside a dark 
one frequently serves to obscure the latter. Obviously 
the service station was lighted to attract attention to it, 
not to illuminate the highway. 
A car passed through the intersection going north 
in front of the bicycle. The witness Moulton, who was 
immediately behind the defendant's truck, and who was 
81 watching the intersection, did not see the bicycle. Should 
we not conclude then that the bicycle was behind the car 
in such a position in the darkness that it could not be 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
Trans. Page 
~een ·? 'l~his is an especially reasonable assumption be-
cause the bicyclist was negligent in at least two particu-
lars, 1nore fully discussed further on in this brief. He 
114 failed to have a lamp on his bicycle, although it was dark, 
101 and he was driving in the center lane rather than near 
the curb. Second West Street is a two lane highway 
south of 9th South Street and a four lane highway north 
of 9th South Street. Except for the center line, the lanes 
were un1narked on the highway (Exhibit D). The east 
curb line of 2nd West Street north of Ninth South 
Street is 22 feet east of where it would be if it 
followed the extension of the east curb line of 2nd 
West Street south of 9th South. A bicyclist then, to 
continue along the curb, as he is required by statute and 
ordinance to do, would necessarily turn in a northeasterly 
direction across 9th South Street in order to reach the 
curb line continuing north on 2nd West Street. The loca-
tion of the probable point of impact shows that the de-
ceased boy was driving due north in the inside lane of 
traffic and was not proceeding parallel to the pedestrian 
lane as he would normally be expected to do. Adamson or 
any other driver would normally see the car coming thru 
the intersection and see no light behind it and 'vould 
drive watching for pedestrians in the pedestrian lane or 
bicyclists near it. The impact occurred at a location in 
the middle of the road where Adamson as a reasonable 
driver would not expect a bicyclist to be. An impact with 
a bicycle without lights in a location where it is not sup-
posed to be certainly does not denote failure to keep a 
lookout. 
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The charge that the defendant Adan1son failed to 
yield to Sylvester Kanon 1nust include two ele1nents : 
(1) that Sylvester Kanon had the right of 'vay and (2) 
that Adan1son actually failed to yield to Kanon, and in 
so doing acted recklessly with a marked disregard of 
the safety of Kanon. The statute pertaining to the right 
of way provides (Rev. Stat. Utah, 1933, Sec. 57-7-31): 
"The driver of a vehicle 'vi thin an intersection 
intending to turn to the left shall yield to any 
vehicle approaching fron1 the opposite direction 
which is within the intersection or so close thereto 
as to constitute an im1nediate hazard, but such 
driver having so yielded and ha~ving gi1.·en a 
signal 'lch en and as required b:v law 1nay make 
such left turn, and other vehicles approaching the 
intersection from the opposite direction shall yield 
to the driver making the left tttrn." (Italics 
added.) 
The court gave part of this law in the Fifth sub-
section of its Instruction No. 5, but failed to give the 
italicized balance of it. So far as determining the right 
of way is concerned the record is blank as to the respec-
tive location of the truck and the bicycle immediately 
prior to the truck's entering of the intersection. The jury 
is left to conjecture as to how fast the bicycle was going; 
115 we know that the truck was going slowly; we also know 
114 that a Model "A" Ford car preceded the bicycle through 
81 the intersection going north. Moulton says that the de-
fendant's truck in front of him slowed on entering the 
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intersection. Thomas Fowler said it slowed down for 
120 the red light, which was green when Adamson \Vent into 
the intersection. Whether it slowed in order to yield to the. 
automobile, we do not know. Neither do we know, how-
ever, that it did not so yield. If it did, and the bicycle was 
then approaching the intersection, then the rider of the 
bicycle had a duty to yield to the truck when the latter 
120 was making the left turn. The Model ''A'' Ford going 
north was stopped for the red light at the intersection. 
Starting up from a dead stop it could not have gone very 
fast through the intersection. Could not the Adamson 
truck in slo,ving down for the red light to turn green, 
have been yielding to the Ford automobile1 In such a 
case where almost everything is left to conjecture the 
rule of the Gutheil case, supra, should be applied: 
''A criminal case requires proof of each element 
of the crime by evidence that convinces one beyond 
all reasonable doubt of the existence of each such 
element." 
4. The fourth charge that the defendant was driv-
ing without due caution and circumspection and at such 
a speed and in such a manner as to endanger the person 
and property of Sylvester Kanon does not allege any 
factual infraction of law and is in a way a summary of 
the three preceding definite charges. In the light of 
State v. Lingman (97 Utah 180, 91 P. (2d) 457), the 
fourth charge becomes an allegation of recklessness, like 
the first three, to mean that Adamson acted with criminal 
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negligence, that his actions were ''reckless, or in marked 
disregard for the safety of others.'' 
It should be noted that the whole prosecution of this 
case was done under the theory that the defendant com-
mitted an unlawful act not amounting to a felony. This 
theory is described in the Ling man case as arm (a) of 
the manslaughter statute : 
''Involuntary rnanslaughter is the unlawful kill-
ing of a human being without malice, in the com-
mission of (a) an unlawful act not a1nounting to 
a felony, o-r (b) in the com1nission of a lawful act 
'vhich might produce death, (1) in an unlawful 
n1anner or (2) vvithout due caution and circum-
spection. '' 
The distinct characteristic of arm (a) under this case is 
that the conduct must be reckless and must evince a 
marked disregard for the safety of others, whereas that 
of arm (b) is that the act must be one that has knowable 
and apparent potentialities for resulting in death. 
The entire prosecution of this ·case was under the 
theory of arm (a) of the statute. Nowhere in the bill of 
particulars is there an allegation that the defendant was 
committing a lawful act which might produce death or an 
act fraught with potentialities for producing death. This 
Court in the Lingman case, supra, pointed the way to a 
proper allegation under the arm (b) of the statute, an act 
fraught with potentialities for producing death: 
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"If forty n1iles an hour had been a la,vful 
speed, then the allegation that -it was dangerous to 
h,un~an life, plus the allegation in the second para-
graph of the hill that 'defendant failed to keep a 
proper and sufficient lookout ahead and failed to 
observe the course of his automobile to see if it 
was obstructed,' 'vould allege the necessary lack 
of 'due care and circumspection' which, added to 
the lawful speed w-ith potentiality for producing 
death, would present a situation for an instruction 
under arm (b). '' (Italics added.) 
Neither did the court in its instructions include a 
standard under arm (b) of the statute, and it refused 
defendant's requested Instruction No. 8: 
''You are instructed that the 'vords 'act 
which might produce death' which are used in the 
statute defining involuntary manslaughter, do not 
mean every act which theoretically might pro-
duce death. These words must be considered by 
you to mean an act which has knowable and ap-
parent potentialities for resulting in death.'' 
And in its Instruction No. 4 the court expressly limited 
the charge to the (a) arm of the statute: 
"You are instructed that involuntary man-
slaughter, insofar as material to this case, is de-
fined by the laws of the State of Utah as the un-
lawful killing of a hu1nan being, without malice, 
in the commission of an unlawful act not amount-
ing to a felony, when such unlawful act is com-
mitted by the defendant in such manner as to 
evince on his part marked disregard for the safety 
of others, or recklessness.'' 
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The fourth charge of the bill of particulars, that 
the defendant was driving without due caution and cir-
cumspection and at such a speed and in such a manner as 
to endanger the person and property of Sylvester Kanon, 
must also come under the (a) arm of the manslaughter 
statute, and the State had the burden of proving that 
such driving was reckless, or in marked disregard for 
the safety of others. Nothing was proved to show such 
driving. 
The State's charge rests, therefore, upon these three 
alleged infractions of the law as set forth in the bill of 
particulars: 
1. Excessive speed. 
2. Failure to keep a lookout. 
3. Failure to yield to the deceased. 
In none of these particulars does the record show 
any evidence of a reckless conduct or conduct evincing 
a marked disregard for the safety of others. 
When we summarize the evidence the only facts we 
have are that some time before the accident somewhere 
between 3rd South and 9th South Streets, Adamson was 
driving at a maximum of 35 to 40 miles per hour and 
that there was a collision between his truck and a bi-
cyclist. How can such evidence justify a court's refusal 
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to grant defendant's motion to dismiss the charge! There 
is clearly no reckless conduct shown at all; certainly not 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The district court erred then in denying defendant's 
109, 14 motion to dismiss, and in denying defendant's motion for 
123, 17 a directed verdict. It further erred in denying defend-
55, 61 ant's motio11: in arrest of judgment on the ground that the 
facts proved at .the trial failed to prove the defendant 
guilty of the crime charged, and finally it erred in deny-
59, 61 ing defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground that 
the verdict was contrary to the evidence. 
II. THE COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING THE 
JURY. 
1. The court erred in giving the Fifth subsection of 
its Instruction No. 5, relating to the right of way, and in 
failing to submit to the jury all of the law pertaining to 
right of way. (Specifications of Error Nos. 6, 7.) 
The subsection as it was given to the jury is as fol-
lows: 
44 ''Fifth: That it shall be unlawful for the 
driver of a vehicle within an intersection 'vho 
intends to turn left to fail to yield to any vehicle 
approaching from the opposite direction which is 
within the intersection or so close thereto as to 
constitute an immediate hazard.'' 
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This charge, 'vhich purported to set out the appli-
cable statute, omitted part of the vital provision of this 
statute (Rev. Stat. of Utah 1933, Sec. 57-7-31), which 
reads as follows : 
''The driver of a vehicle within an intersec-
tion intending to turn to the left shall yield to any 
vehicle approaching from the opposite direction 
which is within the intersection or so close thereto 
as to constitute an immediate hazard, but such 
dri.ver having so yielded and having given a signal 
when and as required by law, 1nay 1nake such left 
turn, and other vehicles approach,ing the inter-
section from the opposite direction shall yield to 
the driver making the left turn.'' 
The part we have italicized was omitted from the court's 
instructions. 
(a) Here is a manifest error of giving an instruc-
tion unsupported by evidence. There is nothing in the case 
to indicate the location of the bicyclist immediately be-
fore Adamson's turn to the left, or to show whether he 
was within the intersection or so close thereto as to con-
stitute an immediate hazard. There is nothing to indicate 
how fast the bicyclist was peddling at this time or how 
slowly the truck was going except that it was proceeding 
slowly. To conclude from the fact that there was a 
collision that the bicyclist was so close to the intersection 
as to constitute an immediate hazard is to beg the issue. 
If that conclusion followed, every driver making a left 
turn who had a collision would be found guilty of violat-
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ing this section of the statute. It was improper to include 
this charge at all in the instructions. 
To what extent did the bicyclist have the right of 
way~ He was violating the law in at least two particulars 
in failing to have a light on his bicycle and in failing 
to keep on the right side of the road. The law requires 
(Rev. Stat. of Utah, 1933, Sec. 57-7-22): 
''In driving upon the right half of a highway, 
the driver shall drive as closely as practicable to 
the right hand edge or curb of the highway, ex-
cept when overtaking or passing another vehicle in 
position to make a left turn.'' 
The Salt Lake City ordinances in force at that time 
provided: 
111 ''Persons riding bicycles upon any of the 
public streets of this city must observe the same 
rules for the use of said streets that apply to 
drivers of vehicles, except when by their very 
nature they are inapplicable, and riders of bi-
cycles upon said streets, and every person driving 
a vehicle or electric trolley coach, except electric 
coaches in the business districts, shall drive as 
closely as practicable to the right-hand edge or 
curb of the street, except when overtaking 
or passing another vehicle or bicycle, or when 
placing a vehicle or bicycle in a position to n1ake 
a left turn. '' (Italics ours.) 
In Dixon v. Bergin, 64 Utah 195, 228 Pac. 744, this 
court approved in a civil case the giving in an instruction 
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of a Salt Lake City ordinance requiring bicycles to keep 
close to the right hand gutter. It said: 
'' _.'-\s pointed out in a recent decision of this 
court, ordinances regulating travel upon our 
streets Inay becon1e absolutely necessary . . . 
\\.,.-here, therefore, vehicles can be classified and 
different portions of the street can be set apart 
for different classes of vehicles, and the city au-
thorities, in the interest of public safety, dee1n it 
proper to do so, the courts are bound to enforce 
all such reasonable regulations.'' 
99 We have already indicated that the supposed point 
of impact located the bicyclist on a line practically due 
north of the point where he passed the Fowlers near the 
east curb of Second West south of 9th South. The 
89, Fowlers testified that the bicyclist was going north. His 
115 duty under the statute and the Salt Lake City ordinance 
was to turn sharply to the right upon reaching 9th South 
Street. In failing to do so, did he still retain his right of 
way, if he had it originally~ Does a driver always retain 
a right of way, no matter what his position~ Would 
he have retained his right of way if he had been entirely 
on the left side of the road in the lane for south bound 
traffic~ If not, then at what point would he lose his 
right of way~ Did Kanon have a right of way over an 
oncoming vehicle even though he was riding in the dark 
without a light to warn Adamson of his presence~ In 
such circumstances discussion of ''right of way'' becomes 
incongruous. Yet the court gave an instruction on part 
of the law of right of way. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Trans. Page 
28 
''A driver can not be required to yield the 
right of way when his inability to know and act 
is chargeable to the lawless conduct of him who 
claims it. '' Andrus r. Hall, 27 Pac. ( 2d) 495, 93 
Colo. 526. 
The giving of an instruction on the right of way 
when there was no evidence of failure to yield the right 
of way was error. 
In State vs. Johnson, 76 Utah 84, 287 P. 909, there 
was insufficient evidence to found a charge of operating 
an automobile under the influence of intoxicating liquor, 
but the court included that charge with other charges 
in its instructions to the jury. This Court held that to 
be error, saying : 
''The question presented is as to whether error 
was committed in submitting to the jury a ma-
terial issue upon which it is claimed there was 
insufficient evidence to support it, and if so, 
whether the error was prejudicial. If in a civil 
case where several acts of negligence are charged, 
each constituting actionable negligence, and the 
evidence is insufficient as to one of such acts, but 
against objections nevertheless is submitted to the 
jury and a general verdict rendered in favor of the 
plaintiff, hardly any one would contend that no 
prejudice resulted on the ground that the evidence 
was sufficient to sustain the verdict on the other 
alleged acts. In principle, the matter in hand is 
not different. The jury here rendered a general 
verdict of guilty 'as charged in the information.' 
It thereby found the defendant guilty of an un-
lawful act not supported or justified by the evi-
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dence. Because the unla,vful act related to or con-
cerned intoxicating liquors does not call for an 
abridgtuent of the general rule that to justify a 
submission of a material issue to a jury there 
n1ust be sufficient evidence to support it, nor as 
to the prejudicial effect against 'vho1n it is sub-
mitted and a general verdict rendered in favor of 
his adversary having the burden of proof. The 
general verdict here is not severable. Letting all 
the issues as to all of the alleged unlawful acts to 
the jury gave them to understand that they could 
render a verdict of guilty on any one or all of them, 
which 'vas required to be expressed only by a 
general verdict. Some of the jurors may have 
been induced to join in the verdict on one or more 
of the alleged acts, some on other alleged acts, 
but on which or on all it is ilnpossible to tell. That 
none of the jury was induced to join in the verdict 
because of the submission of the issue as to in-
toxication is also impossible to tell. We . cannot 
review a criminal action like an equity case-try 
it de novo on the record-and ourselves determine 
the guilt or innocence of the defendant, the weight 
to be given conflicting evidence, the credibility of 
the witnesses, or the weight or credit to be given 
the claim or testimony of the defendant. Though 
the evidence may a1nply or satisfactorily sustain 
the conviction, yet it is not within our province to 
determine the guilt of the defendant and in such 
case justify erroneous and adverse rulings against 
hi1n nonprejudicial. That is to say, if on the 
record we think a defendant guilty or ought to 
have been convicted, 've Inay not regard any kind 
of a trial good enough for him. vV e thus think 
the ruling not only erroneous, but also prejudicial. 
Its very nature had the tendency and was calcu-
lated to do harm, and on the record we cannot 
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say it did no harrn or did not influence the ver-
dict.'' 
(b). It was even more improper, however, having 
included this charge, to leave out a part which was as 
pertinent to the evidence as that left in. Certainly there 
was as much evidence that Adamson yielded in com-
pliance with the last half of the statute as there was that 
114 the bicycle constituted an immediate hazard. A Model 
120 ''A'' Ford automobile preceded the bicycle through the 
intersection. When Thomas Fowler was asked by the 
district attorney, speaking of the defendant Adamson, 
"He didn't stop at all for the red lightY" the witness 
repeated that Ada1nson turned on the green light, and 
answered, ''He slowed down.'' In other words, Adamson 
was so close to the intersection while the light was still 
red that he had to slow down for it to turn green. Yet the 
Model ''A'' Ford which was stopped dead on the other 
side of 9th South Street for the light to turn green, 
passed the middle of the intersection before Adamson's 
truck turned through it. The two cars were so close 
together that the court could not arbitrarily say that 
the defendant did not yield to this Model ''A'' Ford. 
Yet that is what the court did in excluding part of the 
statute. Certainly the jury had the right to all of this law. 
2. The court erred in refusing to instruct the jury 
in the facts pertaining to the conduct of the deceased as 
the proximate cause of the accident. (Specifications of 
error Nos. 8-18.) 
(a) . Closely related to the pro ble1n just discussed is 
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the failure of the court properly to instruct the jury on 
the fact of the deceased's violations of these statutes 
and ordinances and the relationship of these violations 
to the accident. The court refused to give the following 
instructions requested by the defendant: 
31 .. Defendant's Reqttested Instruction ]\r o. 1.5. 
''You are instructed that a driver rnay pre-
sume that others in the road 'vill conduct them-
selves in a la"rful manner. If you find that though 
Sylvester Kanon \vas 'vithin the intersection or so 
close thereto as to constitute an immediate haz-
ard he was riding his bicycle in an unlawful man-
ner and that it was because of his so riding in an 
unlawful manner that the defendant Grant Adam-
son failed to see him, then you must find that the 
defendant Adamson did not act unlawfully In 
failing to yield to Sylvester Kanon.'' 
36 "Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 20. 
"You are instructed that the Salt Lake City 
ordinances provide that riders of bicycles upon 
the city streets shall drive as closely as practicable 
to the right hand edge or curb of the street except 
'vhen overtaking or passing another vehicle or 
bicycle, or when placing a vehicle or bicycle in a 
position to n1ake a left turn.'' 
37 "Defendant's Requested lnstr1tction No. 21. 
''You are instructed that if you find the de-
ceased bicyclist was not follo,ving as closely to the 
right hand curb of the street as practicable, then 
you must find that he did not have the right of 
way over the defendant.'' 
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These three instructions clearly presented to the 
court the propositon that a bicyclist does not always have 
the right of way regardless of what his position might 
be within the intersection. We submit that the court erred 
in not giving these instructions to the jury. 
On the law that a bicyclist riding in the dark without 
a lighted lamp did not have the right of way over an 
oncoming vehicle, the court had the opportunity to give 
the jury defendant's requested instruction No.15, already 
quoted, as well as requested instructions 12, 13, 14, and 
16. These instructions were particularly necessary, 
however, not only to present fully the question of the 
right of way, but also to determine whether Kanon's 
negligence, rather than the defendant's, was the cause 
of the accident. The requested instructions follow: 
28 "Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 12. 
"You are instructed that the law requires 
that, 'Every bicycle upon a highway during the 
period from a half hour after sunset to a half 
hour before sunrise shall be equipped with a 
lighted lamp on the front thereof visible under 
normal atmospheric conditions from a distance 
of at least three hundred feet in front of such 
bicycle '. ' ' 
29 "Defendant·'s Requested Instruction No. 13. 
"You are instructed that if you find that at 
the time of the accident Sylvester Kanon was 
riding a bicycle which was not equipped with a 
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lighted lamp, that such riding· '\\'"as unlawful, and 
if you find that his so riding 'vas the proximate 
cause of his death you n1ust find the defendant 
not guilty.'' 
''Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 14. 
''You are instructed that if -YOU find that 
Sylvester Kanon drove a bicycle at the time of 
the accident 'vhich was not equipped with a lighted 
lan1p on the front thereof, his riding the bicycle in 
that manner was negligence and should be con-
sidered by you in connection with all other mat-
ters pertaining to the said accident." 
"Defendant's Requested Instruct-ion No. 16. 
''You are instructed that the law does not 
require a person to anticipate or guard against 
events which are not reasonably to be expected, 
nor does the law require a person to regulate his 
conduct with reference to the conduct of another 
person 'vhich is not reasonably to be expected.'' 
111 The sun that evening set at 7 :40. Witness Moulton 
73 had left the ice cream parlor between 3rd and 4th South 
Streets shortly after eight o'clock. Particularly with the 
evidence of darkness, the court should have instructed 
the jury as to the bicyclist's negligence in violating 
the statute requiring a lighted lamp on the bicycle. Cer-
tainly there was enough evidence to require the court at 
least to submit to the jury the question of the violation 
and of the bicyclist's negligence. 
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Laws of Utah 1935, Chapter 48, Page 121, Sec. 57-7-
55 provides as follows : 
"(1). Every vehicle upon a highway during 
the period froin a half hour after sunset to a 
half hour before sunrise, and at any other tin1e 
when there is not sufficient light to render clear-
ly discernible any person on the highway at a 
distance of 200 feet ahead, shall be equipped 
with lighted front and rear lamps as in this sec-
tion respectively required for different classes of 
vehicles, subject to exemption with reference to 
lights on parked vehicles as declared in subsec-
tion (11) ... 
"(10). Every bicycle upon a highway during 
the period from a half hour after sunset to a half 
hour before sunrise shall be equipped with a light-
ed lamp on the front thereof visible under normal 
atmospheric conditions from a distance of at least 
300 feet in front of such bicycle and shall also be 
equipped with a reflector or lamp on the rear ex-
hibiting a red light visible under like conditions 
from a distance of at least 200 feet to the rear of 
such bicycle. ' ' 
These instructions were not requested for the pur-
pose of showing contributory negligence on the part of 
the bicyclist. They were pertinent because they would 
permit the jury to determine 'vhether or not under the 
circumstances the defendant Adamson was negligent. 
There is all the difference in the world between riding 
down a bicyclist in broad daylight and in striking a bi-
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cyclist in the dark 'vhen he is not 'vhere he lawfully should 
be. 
In People vs. Cantpbell, 212 N. W. 97, 237 ~fich. 244, 
the Supretne Court reversed a conviction of involuntary 
manslaughter because the lower court had taken from the 
jury the facts sho,ving the deceased's negligence, saying: 
"The defendant 'vas driving 6 feet from the 
curb. The night \\Tas dark and 1nisty. H·e testi-
fied that he was keeping a lookout, hut that he 
assumed that no person would be 'valking out in 
that part of the highway "There he was driving. 
The deceased were not crossing the highway. They 
'vere "Talking 6 feet fron1 the eurb, 'vith their backs 
to approaching cars. 'Ve think it 'vas for the 
jury to say 'vhether, under all of the circum-
stances, they were using ordinary care for their 
own safety in walking 6 feet out from the curb, 
in a dark and misty atmosphere, on an extensively 
traveled highway, with their backs to approaching 
automobiles. Considering the darkness, the misty 
atmosphere, the slippery condition of the pave-
ment, their position in the highway, the fact that 
there was a safer place to 'valk, and their knowl-
edge of the fact that automobiles would be con-
stantly overtaking them fron1 the rear, 'vere the 
deceased, at the time of accident, using ordinary 
care for their o'vn safety"? If the~T 'vere not, that 
fact would not be a defense, but it would be an 
important factor in the case, which the defendant 
would be entitled to have the jury consider.'' 
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In People v. Barnes, 182 Mich. 179, 148 N. W. 400, the 
court held it reversible error to withhold from the jury 
the conduct of the deceased, saying: 
''While the claimed contributory negligence 
of Mary Robb is no defense in this case, yet it does 
not follow that her conduct should be eliminated 
from the case; it should be considered as bearing 
upon the claimed culpable negligence of the re-
spondent, and the question should all the time be: 
'' 'Was respondent responsible under the law, 
whether Mary Robb's failure to use due care con-
tributed to her injury or not¥' '' 
A California Court of Appeals (People v. Hurley, 
56 Pac. (2d) 978, 13 Cal. App. (2d) 208 pointed out that 
the convicted appellant was driving on his own right-hand 
side of the road and the deceased whom he struck was 
walking on the wrong side of the road, and said: 
"While contributory negligence of the de-
ceased is no defen~e in a manslaughter prosecu-
tion, still it may have an important bearing on the 
degree of culpability of appellant. The law re-
quired Schwitz to walk close to his left hand edge 
of the roadway. Section 564, Vehicle Code. Had 
he obeyed the law there would have been no col-
lision as he would not have been in the path of the 
Cord. Appellant had the right to assume that 
pedestrians would obey the law and that no one 
would be walking down the road in the path of his 
automobile. While this would not excuse him from 
keeping a vigilant watch of the roadway in front 
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of his car, it has an important bearing on the 
degree of his lack of care. 
'' Under the facts of this case, and the de-
cisions we have cited, 've have reached the con-
clusion that the evidence shows appellant guilty 
of only the lack of the exercise of ordinary care, 
and not of gross indifference to or such a disregard 
of the safety of others as is necessary to consti-
tute criminal negligence. It follows that the 
judg1nent pronounced upon him upon his convic-
tion of involuntary manslaughter, and the order 
denying his motion for new trial made in that 
case, must be reversed.'' 
The same question was ruled upon in the case of 
State v. Sisneros, 82 Pac. (2d) 274, 42 N. Mex. 500. The 
court reversed the conviction, saying: 
"While the defendant is not excused by the 
contributory negligence of Chavez, yet that neg-
ligence should have been taken into consideration 
by the jury in determining the proximate cause of 
the death of Chavez (citing cases), and the court 
should have so instructed the jury. 
''Chavez was inviting disaster when he 
parked his car on the highway, without lights. 
The sudden turning on in the dark of the lights 
of an unseen car is startling to the driver of a 
closely approaching automobile and is likely to 
cause him to swerve from his course ... 
''The action of the jury can be accounted for 
by the seriousness of the tragedy, and the failure 
of the court to instruct it under either count, that 
the unlawful act charged must have been the 
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proximate cause of the death of Chavez: and his 
failure to instruct specifically on defendant's 
theory of the case, regarding the flashing of the 
lights and consequent blinding of the defendant 
which was his only affirmative defense; and his 
failure to instruct upon the negligence of Chavez 
as bearing upon the question of whether any 
criminal negligent act of defendant was the proxi-
mate cause of Chavez' death; neither of which 
was requested or given. This cannot be con-
sidered as error, because not called to the atten-
tion of the district court or presented here; but 
it probably accounts for the verdict." 
The Tennessee court in Copeland v. Stat~, 285 S. W. 
565, 49 A. L. R. 605, likewise held it reversible error not 
to charge that it must appear that the death was not the 
result of misadventure, saying: 
''The contributory negligence of the boy 
would not relieve Copeland of the consequence of 
his unlawful act . . . But the conduct of the boy 
was entitled to consideration in determining 
whether under the circumstances, Copeland's neg-
ligence was the proximate cause of death or 
whether death resulted from an unavoidable acci-
dent." 
In State v. Bowser, 124 Kan. 556, 261 Pac. 846, the 
court said: 
''The court correctly instructed that the neg-
ligence of Anderson, if any, was no defense to thr 
alleged crime of Bowser, but the instruction was 
somewhat lame in failing to state that the de-
cedent's negligence, if shown, should be con-
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sidered 'vith all the other evidence to detern1ine 
whether so1ne negligent act or o1nission of de-
fendant ~s \\~a~ or \Va~ not the proxhnate cause of 
Anderson's death, or \vhether, under the circunl-
~tances, defendant ~s aet \Vas negligent at all.'' 
Defendant's requested Instructions numbered 12, 13, 14, 
15, 16, 17, 20 and 21 should therefore have been given. 
In line with the authorities just cited the lower court 
should have given defendant's requested Instruction 
No. 10, and erred in refusing it. This instruction reads as 
follows: 
''You are instructed that even if you were to 
be convinced that the defendant on1itted to per-
form a duty, nevertheless if an unlawful act or 
negligent act of another person intervened be-
tween the omission of the defendant and the death 
and was the direct cause of the death, then you 
must find the defendant not guilty." 
The lower court in refusing this probably had in mind a 
conception of the contributory negligence doctrine, but 
it totally failed to see the necessity of the instruction in 
determining the proximate cause of the decedent's death. 
The jury were entitled to all of the facts, including the 
deceased's negligence, to determine what was the cause 
of the accident. Among these facts were that the de-
ceased was violating an ordinance and statute in riding 
as he did. This is another reason, too, that the requested 
instructions No. 15, 20, 21, and 12 (heretofore quoted) 
should have been given. 
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In Dunville v. State, 123 N. E. 689, cited in the first 
section of this brief, the defendant motorcyclist killed a 
child who ran into the street in front of him. The Indiana 
Supreme Court said: 
''Counsel for the state say that contributory 
negligence of the child has nothing to do with th~ 
case. This is true in a sense. It is not a question 
of contributory negligence. Of course we know 
that a child 2 years and 9 months old is not 
sui juris, and cannot be guilty of negligence, m· 
contributory negligence, in the ordinary sense of 
those terms; but the conduct of this child, in the 
circumstances shown by the evidence, is just as 
cogent in breaking down the intent which the law 
imputes to appellant after the event as like con-
duct on the part of an adult in like circumstances 
would be in repelling such imputation. It is not 
a question of contributory negligence, but it is 
one of proximate cause. 
''So the question is, Did appellant conduct 
himself at the time and place in such a manner as 
to show a willful and wanton disregard for the 
rights of others, from which the law infers an 
intent to cause death, and did his conduct cause 
the death ... 
''The most the evidence discloses is negligence 
on the part of appellant. For aught that appears 
in this case the proximate cause of Frances Held's 
death was the fact that she ran in front of appel-
lant's motorcycle and suddenly stopped. For 
aught that is shown by the evidence, the accident 
would have occurred had appellant been proceed-
ing in the most careful manner.'' 
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Faced suddenly with the appearance of a bicycle be-
fore him, in a place where the bicycle was not legally 
supposed to be, and 'vould not be expected, the defendant 
Adamson 'vas in an en1ergency not of his own making. 
Just as in State v. Gutheil, supTa, in "~hich case defendant 
was suddenly faced with an automobile illegally being 
pushed across the highway, so here Adamson was sud-
denly faced with an unlighted bicycle out in the middle 
of the road behind an automobile. In such an emer-
gency Adamson should not have been expected to exercise 
the degree of care that would be expected had not this 
emergency arisen. While there is no evidence of lack of 
care on the part of Grant Adamson, there is evidence 
of the emergency created by the negligent driving of the 
bicyclist. Therefore the court should have given to the 
jury defendant's requested instruction No. 17: 
33 "You are instructed that when a person is 
placed without negligence on his part suddenly 
in a position of peril without sufficient time to 
consider all of the circumstances, that law does not 
require of him the same degree of care and cau-
tion that it requires of a person who has ample 
opportunity for the full exercise of his judgn1ent 
and reasoning facilities.'' 
The court erred also in refusing to give, in connection 
36 with defendant's requested instruction No. 20, defend-. 
ant's requested instructions Nos. 18 and 19 : 
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34 "Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 18. 
"You are instructed that the Salt Lake Cih 
Ordinances provide that riders of bicycles upo~ 
the city streets shall drive as closely as practicable 
to the right hand edge or curb of the street ex-
cept when overtaking or passing another vehicle 
or bicycle, or when placing a vehicle or bicycle in 
a position to make a left turn. You are instructed 
that if you find that the deceased bicyclist vio-
lated the ordinance mentioned in Instruction 
No. ______ you shall find him negligent, and if his 
negligence was the proximate cause of his death, 
you shall find the defendant not guilty.'' 
35 ''Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 19. 
"You are instructed that if you find that the 
deceased bicyclist viola ted the ordinance men-
tioned in Instruction No. ______ you shall find him 
negligent, and if his negligence was the proximate 
cause of his death, you shall find the defendant 
not guilty.'' 
3. The court, in modifying defendant's requested i~ 
struction No.9, cast the burden of proof upon defendant. 
(Specification of error No. 19.) 
The court erred in refusing defendant's requested 
25 instruction No. 9: 
''You are instructed that in determining 
whether or not the defendant was guilty of crimi-
nal negligence as that term is defined to you in 
other instructions you should consider the con-
duct of Sylvester Kanon immediately prior to 
the accident and at the time of the accident, to-
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gether with all the other facts and circumstances 
surrounding the accident.'' 
46 The court modified that in its Instruction No. 7a and 
added these \vords: 
"'If you believe from all the evidence in the case 
that· the sole proximate cause of the injuries to 
and the death of the said Sylvester Kanon was a 
result of the acts and conduct of the said Syl-
vester Kanon, then you should return a verdict of 
not guilty.'' 
This was prejudicial error. It had the effect of shifting 
the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant. 
In State v. Laris, 78 Utah 183, 2 Pac. (2d) 243, this court 
held that it was error to give a certain instruction because 
it cast upon the defendant the burden of establishing the 
good faith of a person, saying: 
''As the burden of proof to establish the 
commission of a crime necessarily extends to 
every essential element of the crime, the burden 
is, of course, with the state to overcome that pre-
sumption beyond a reasonable doubt. 
''A very similar question \Vas before the 
Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, in the 
case of Drossos v. U. 8., 2 F. (2) 538. An instruc-
tion that, if the jury was convinced that the ac-
cused's relationship with the woman was inno-
cent, and that he had no intention of having im-
moral relations with her, he should be acquitted. 
It was held that the instruction was erroneous 
and prejudicial in shifting the burden of proof 
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on the accused, and that the error was not cured 
by an instruction that the accused is presumed to 
be innocent until he is proved guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and, in case of a reasonable 
doubt as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily 
sho"\\rn, he is entitled to an acquittal." 
The Instruction No. 7 a given by the court in the 
case at bar eliminated all possibilities of the defendant's 
being found not guilty other than that the death of 
Sylvester Kanon was a result of the acts and conduct 
of Sylvester Kanon. It laid undue emphasis upon the 
duty of the jury to find that his acts "were the sole 
proximate cause" of the injury and death. 
4. The court, in refusing to give defendant's re-
quested instruction No.3, denied to the jury a needed clar-
ification of two definitions of care already given them. 
(Specification of error No. 20.) 
The court erred in refusing to give defendant's re-
quested Instruction No. 3 : 
19 "You are instructed that the words, 'Without 
due caution and circumspection' as used in the 
Statute of the State of Utah defining the offense 
of involuntary manslaughter must be construed 
as meaning 'criminal negligence'.'' 
In the first and second subdivisions of its Instruction 
No.5, the court set forth provisions of the statutes which, 
taken together without explanation, led the jury to as-
sume that there are two standards of care, a violation of 
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either of which should permit conviction. The first sub-
division sets forth the true standard of care in an In-
voluntary Inanslaughter action: 
'"You are instructed that the laws of the 
State of Utah in force on the 5th day of August, 
1940, provide as follows : 
''First: That it shall be unlawful for any per-
son to drive any vehicle upon any highway care-
lessly and heedlessly in wilful or wanton dis-
regard of the rights and safety of others.'' 
The second, however, reads as follows: 
"Second: That it shall be unla\vful for any 
person to drive any vehicle upon any highway 
without due caution and circumspection and at 
such a speed or in such a manner as to endanger 
any person or property.'' 
Instruction No. 6 required for conviction that the 
jury find that the violation of the statutes was reckless or 
was an act evincing a marked disregard for the safety of 
others. This to a lawyer would have the effect of giving 
to the second subdivision of Instruction No. 5 the same 
meaning as that of the first subdivision of that instruc-
tion. However, the effect on a jury of laymen of these 
two standards placed next to each other is to emphasize 
some distinction between the two standards of the first 
and second subdivisions: the standard of (1) acting with 
"wilful or wanton disregard'' and (2) that of acting 
"without due caution and circumspection." A definition 
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of the words "without due caution and circumspection" 
was necessary, and the court erred in refusing defend-
ant's requested Instruction No. 3. ''Criminal negli-
gence'' was defined by the court in its Instruction No. 10, 
but "due caution and circumspection" was not defined. 
The giving of defendant's requested Instruction No. 3 
was a needed clarification of the law, and its omission was 
prejudicial error. 
CONCLUSION 
The prosecution rested its whole case upon four al-
leged violations of the statute by the defendant, Adam-
son. In all of these four it failed to prove any violation 
by the defendant and the court should have granted 
plaintiff's motion to dismiss, plaintiff's motion for a di-
rected verdict, plaintiff's motion for new trial and plain-
tiff's motion in arrest of judgment. 
In addition to its failure to recognize that the State 
did not prove a public offense the court erred in the 
following particulars : 
(1). It included in its instructions a charge quoting 
part of the statute pertaining to the right of way, though 
there was no evidence of failure to yield the right of wa~< 
Not only did it do this but it failed to include all of the 
law on the right of way and gave only that part which 
assumed in itself that the defendant did not yield. 
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( 2). It failed to give to the jury all of the facts per-
taining to the accident and in particular: 
(a). That the boy's riding a bicycle after dark with-
out a lighted lamp was negligence and was illegal: 
(b). That the boy's crossing an intersection in the 
middle of the road at a place where he was not supposed 
to be was negligence and was illegal. 
(3). It shifted the burden of proof In modifying 
defendant's requested Instruction No.9. 
( 4). In refusing to give defendant's requested in-
struction No.3, defining the phrase "without due caution 
and circumspection,'' it deprived the jury of necessary 
clarification of standards of care in a manslaughter 
action and led the jury to assume that the defendant, 
Adamson, should be judged by a standard of care used 
in civil negligence cases. 
In short, under the meager facts adduced at the trial 
and the insufficient instructions which were given to the 
jury by the court, Adamson should be found as a matter 
of law not guilty of the ''reckless handling, or conduct 
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evincing a marked disregard for the safety of others," 
that this court has required in the Gutheil and Lingmom 
cases for conviction of involuntary manslaughter. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MOYLE, RICHARDS & McKAY, 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
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